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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

ANN B. HOPKINS

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Appel lee,

v.
PRICE WATERHOUSE

No. 90-7099

)

Appellant.

)

MOTION FOR SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE
Plaintiff Ann Hopkins has filed an opposition to defendant
Price Waterhouse's application for a stay pending appeal.

She

files this Motion for Summary Affirmance with her stay opposition
under this Court's General Rules 7(h) (3) and 7(i).

Summary

disposition is appropriate here because the "merits of this
appeal are so clear as to make summary affirmance proper."
Walker v. Washington, 627 F.2d 541, 545 (D.C. Cir.)
cert . denied, 449 U.S. 994 (1980).

( ~ curiam),

See also Taxpayers Watchdog,

Inc. v. Stanley, 819 F.2d 294, 297 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
Ambach v. Bell, 686 F.2d 974, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1982)

(per curiam);
(per curiam) ; -

United States v. Allen, 408 F.2d 1287, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
curiam).

(per

Y

In addition , this case has been in the courts, including the
Supreme Court, for six years.

Important issues of Title VII law

y In accordance with General Rule 7(i), copies of the
district court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on
Remand, May 14, 1990 (hereafter Remand Decision), and remedial
Order, May 25, 1990, are attached at Tabs 1 and 2.

have been resolved, and the district court has now found that
Price Waterhouse violated Title VII and has awarded relief to the
plaintiff.

The trial court's determination on liability is

governed by F.R.Civ.P. 52(a) and is not clearly erroneous, and
the court's "chosen method of redressing a Title VII violation is
reviewable under the abuse of discretion standard."
Lujan, 888 F.2d 153, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1989).

Lander v.

There was no abuse

here.
Ann Hopkins was 34 years old when she joined Price
Waterhouse in 1978.

She was 39 when sexual sterotyping defeated

her candidacy for partnership in 1983.

She is now 46.

normal retirement age at Price Waterhouse is 60.

The

It is time for

this case to be over, so that she may begin finally to rebuild a
career interrupted by discrimination.

INTRODUCTION
Originally filed in July 1984, this case was tried in March
1985.

The principal issue was whether Price Waterhouse violated

Title VII when it rejected Ann Hopkins' candidacy for partnership
in the firm -- and instead placed her on "hold" -- in the spring
of 1983.

The district court found that prohibited discrimi-

nation, in the form of sexual sterotyping, had infected the
decision-making process on Hopkins' candidacy.

The court also

found that defendant had not proved by clear and convincing
evidence that Hopkins would have been rejected even in the
absence of bias.

The court ruled, however, that Hopkins'

departure from Price Waterhouse in early 1984 -- after her office

-
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had failed to renominate her -- was not a constructive discharge
and hence foreclosed prospective relief, such as an order
requiring her admission to the firm as a partner.
Price Waterhouse, 618 F.Supp. 1109 (D.D.C. 1985).

Hopkins v.

Y

on appeal, this Court affirmed the district court's finding
that Price Waterhouse had "permitt[ed) sterotypical attitudes
towards women to play a significant, though unquantifiable, role
in its decision not to invite [Hopkins) to become a partner."
Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458, 461 (D.C. Cir.
1987).

The Court also agreed that defendant had not proved by

clear and convincing evidence that it would have rejected Hopkins
in a neutral setting and therefore affirmed the district court's
finding on liability.

Id. at 472.

The Court reversed on relief, however, holding that
Price Watemouse' s [ 1983 J decision to deny Hopkins
partnership status, coupled with [her office's)
failure to renominate her, would have been viewed by
any reasonable senior manager in her position as a
career-ending decision. Accordingly, it arrounted to a

constructive discharge.

Id. at 473.

Given this ruling, the Court remanded the case "for

the determinatiQn__of - appropriate damages and relief~~"
on these relief issues, the Court was unanimous.

Id.

And

See 825 F.2-4--~~

473 n.1.

y The trial court observed that back pay -- in an amount
equal to Hopkins' lost earnings between the date when she would
have been admitted as a partner absent bias (July 1, 1983)
through her January 1984 departure -- would ordinarily have been
available.
No evidence on earnings losses had then been
presented, however, and the court declined to award back pay.
618 F.Supp. at 1121.
-
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Price Waterhouse then sought Supreme Court review of this
Court's ruling on liability -- but not its holding on relief.
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 s.ct. 1775, 1781 n.1.

The

Supreme Court agreed that Hopkins had shown that discrimination
played a significant role in the 1983 decision on her candidacy,
and that Price Waterhouse could escape liability only by proving
that she would have been rejected even in the absence of bias.
The court held, however, that defendant's efforts in this regard
should be assessed under the preponderance of the evidence
standard rather than the more stringent clear and convincing
test.

The Court therefore reversed and remanded "on liability,"

id. at 1795, although the plurality observed that "Price
Waterhouse does not concretely tell us how its proof was
preponderant even if it was not clear and convincing."

Id. at

1793.
On remand there were two issues:

(1) whether Title VII

liability had been established -- more specifically (and more
narrowly), whether Price Waterhouse had proved by a preponderance
of evidence that Ann Hopkins would have been rejected for
partnership in the absence of discrimination, and (2) appropriate
relief, assuming liability.

The Supreme Court had supplied the

proper evidentiary standard for the liability determination and,
as noted above, this Court had earlier given directions on relief
that were never appealed and that remain the law of the case.
See 825 F.2d at 472-73.
In short, the waters to be navigated on remand were well
charted -- "[a]ll major legal issues in this matter have already

-
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,.
been resolved by prior appeals in this case" (Order denying stay
pending appeal, June 25, 1990)

(Tab 2)

able and experienced district judge.

-- and the helmsman was an
It would be surprising to

find reversible error in such a setting, and there was none.

I.

THE DISTRICT COURT WAS CORRECT, AND SURELY WAS NOT
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS, IN FINDING PRICE WATERHOUSE LIABLE
UNDER TITLE VII

The issue of liability was refined and focused in this Court
and the Supreme Court, and on remand Judge Gesell correctly
framed his task and defendant's burden:
The Court must make a detennination as to whether or
not, absent sex stereotyping discrimination, Ms.
Hopkins would still have been denied a partnership at
the time her carrlidacy first came under consideration
by the firm. The burden of proof rests squarely on
Price Waterhouse to establish that it would have
placed Ms. Hopkins' carrlidacy on hold, rather than
vote her into the partnership, had it not pennitted
sex stereotyping to affect its decision-making
process.
Remand Decision (Tab 1) at 1.
The district court and this Court had previously found that
Price Waterhouse had failed to carry its burden by clear and
convincing evidence, so on remand the narrow liability issue was
whether defendant had nevertheless satisfied the less stringent
preponderance standard.

The trial court said no, and under Civil

Rule 52(a) that finding of fact can be disturbed only if the
reviewing court forms a firm conviction that a mistake has been
committed.

Guzman v. Pichirilo, 369 U.S. 698 (1962); C.I.R. v.

Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960).

-
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-·
The Supreme Court has made clear that Rule 52 applies to all
factual determinations made under Title VII:
If the district court's account of the evidence is
plausible in light of the record viewed in its
entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even
though convinced that had it been sitting" as the trier
of fact it would have weighed the evidence
differently. Where there are two pennissible views of
the evidence, the factfinder's choice between them
cannot be clearly erroneous.
Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985).

See

Bishopp v. District of Columbia, 788 F.2d 781, 785-86 (D.C. Cir.
1986)

("[w]e must, if we are to reverse the district court, have

reached the conclusion that its finding is . . . based on an
utterly implausible account of the evidence").
Judge Gesell's reading of the evidence on the narrow
liability issue was not "utterly implausible."
it was quite clearly correct.

On the contrary,

Specifically, Ann Hopkins was

rejected for partnership because a number of partners who did not
know her well criticized her interpersonal skills.

The district

court originally found that these criticisms, while not wholly
without foundation, were impermissibly tainted by sexual
stereotyping.

Both this Court and the Supreme Court agreed.

This was not a case, then, in which legitimate and
illegitimate factors were clearly and identifiably independent of
one another.

If that were so -- if, for example, Price

Waterhouse had questioned Hopkins' interpersonal skills but had
also maintained some type of objective requirement that she
arguab l y did not meet -- then the analysis would be straightforward.

That is, the firm could have conceded for the sake of
'

argument that its assessment of Hopkins' interpersonal skills was
-
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substantially infected with discrimination, yet still have
asserted that she would not have been promoted because she did
not meet the independent legitimate requirement.

The burden

would have remained on defendant to prove the existence of such
an independent standard unmet by Hopkins, but it is possible -at least in principle -- to envision how this burden could have
been met.
Indeed, this was the situation in Mt. Healthy City School
District Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).

There the

activity protected by the First Amendment -- a telephone call to
a radio station concerning a teacher appearance policy -- was
independent of unprotected misconduct (such as making obscene
gestures to students).

Plaintiff proved that his protected

activity was a "substantial" or "motivating" factor in the
decision not to rehire him, but the Supreme Court gave the
defendant school board the opportunity to argue that the same
decision would have been made based solely on the independent
misconduct.

429 U.S. at 287.

In the present case, however, the legitimate and
illegitimate motivations were inextricably intertwined, and both
related to plaintiff's interpersonal dealings.

Thus the district

court on remand properly observed that
Price Waterhouse, having pennitted discriminatory
comments to be weighed in the hold decision when
appraising Ms. Hopkins, was required to separate the
good from the bad.
Remand Decision at 8.

But the court found, following careful

consideration, that defendant failed in its task:

-
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·Price Waterhouse has failed to separate out those

comments tainted by sexism from those free of sexism
for the purpose of demonstrating that nondiscriminatory factors alone justified the hold
decision.
Id. at 10.
Judge Gesell was blunt about defendant's failure of proof:
"Price Waterhouse had the burden to prove something; it had to
persuade the Court.

This it has failed to do."

Id. at 8.
The trial court's order of July 25, 1990 denying a stay
pending appeal observes that "(n)o proof was presented on the
merits following remand."

Y

That is, Price Waterhouse sought to

carry its burden on remand by relying exclusively on the record
made at the 1985 trial.

But at that trial defendant never

conceded -- even for the sake of argument -- that discrimination
played any role in the decision on Hopkins, so it never sought to
introduce any evidence (expert or otherwise) specifically aimed
at showing that the same decision would have been made even
absent bias.

It never tried to separate the good from the bad.

In short, the proof needed to "unscramble the omelet" was not put
in at the original trial, and no new evidence came in on
remand.

Small wonder that the district court was unpersuaded.

See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 s.ct. at 1790, quoting NLRB
v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 403 (1983)
("'[i]t is fair that [the employer) bear the risk that the
influence of legal and illegal motives cannot be separated,

y On remand the parties presented evidence as to remedy,
but no new proof was taken on liability.
-
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because he knowingly created the risk and because the risk was
created not by innocent activity but by his own wrongdoing'").
The key liability finding on remand -- that defendant had
not proved that it would have rejected Ann Hopkins' candidacy for
partnership in the absence of discrimination -- was made by an
able district judge who had lived with the case for years and who
acted with the benefit of guidance from the Supreme Court.
is nothing close to clear error here.

There

The district court

properly held Price Waterhouse liable for a violation of Title
VII. _i/

II.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S CHOICE OF REMEDY CONSTITUTED A
SOUND EXERCISE OF DISCRETION

Price Waterhouse failed to prove that it would have rejected
Hopkins' candidacy absent bias.

Hence, as the district court

ruled, Hopkins "must be deemed to have failed to receive partnership at the time she was held over because of sex discrimination,
in violation of Title VII."
reasoning is unassailable.

Remand Decision at 11.

This

The plurality in the Supreme Court

observed that "[a] court that finds for a plaintiff under this
standard [i.e., that defendant has not proved that the same
decision would have been made absent bias] has effectively
concluded that an illegitimate motive was a 'but-for' cause of
the employment decision."

109 s.ct. at 1790.

Justice O'Connor

agreed:

_ii In its stay papers, Price Waterhouse does not even
suggest that error infected Judg~ Gesell's determination on
liability.
-
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If the employer fails to carry this burden, the
factfinder is justified in concluding that the
decision was :ma.de ''because of" consideration of the
illegitbra.te factor . . .
Id. at 1804.
In the present case, then, the district court's finding of
liability necessarily means that discrimination based on sex was
the reason plaintiff was placed on hold instead of immediately
being admitted to partnership in 1983 (as many of her male
cohorts were).

The most natural remedy was for the court to

order what had been unlawfully denied -- an offer of partnership
in Price Waterhouse. 21
A.

Constructive Discharge

Before reaching the question of the contours of the remedy,
Judge Gesell first considered constructive discharge.

He had

previously ruled that Hopkins' departure from Price Waterhouse in
January 1984 was not a constructive discharge and thus foreclosed
prospective relief.

This Court, however -- in a section of its

decision that was unanimous and never appealed -- reversed on the
constructive discharge issue.

825 F.2d at 472-73.

Seep. 3

above.
Price Waterhouse argued on remand that Judge Gesell was free
to ignore this Court's determination, contending that the Court
had vacated all aspects of its original decision.

He disagreed:

Folla;,.,ing the original trial, this Court concluded
that Ms. Hopkins was not entitled to partnership or to

2f As a technical matter, Price Waterhouse employs the term
"principal" to describe those of , its partners who are management
consultants. Hopkins is a consultant, so "principal" is used in
the remedial Order (Tab 2).
- 10 -

.

·

back pay because she had failed to prove that she was
constru.ctively discharged. * * * The Court of
Appeals reversed on this point, holding that Ms.
Hopkins was constructively discharged when [her
office J decided not to repropose her. * * * As
Justice Brennan noted, Price Waterhouse did not appeal
this holding to the SUpreme Court. * * * This Court
is bound by it.
Remand Decision at 14 (citations omitted); see generally 11-15.
Among other things, Judge Gesell observed that
[a]s a matter of corranon sense and judicial economy,
the Court of Appeals had no reason to vacate aspects
of the decision dealing with remedy which were
analytically unrelated to the decision on liability.

*

*

*

Here, where there are no new facts or intervening
authority that would provide a basis for questioning
crucial unappealed holdings by the Court of Appeals on
the same factual record, the Court sees no logical
basis for upsetting them.
Remand Decision at 12-13.
Finally, the district court aptly noted that this Court's
"decision in Hopkins has been repeatedly cited in this Circuit,
in every case on the precise issue -- constructive discharge -that Price Waterhouse now wants to avoid."

Id. at 13.

In sum,

this Court's holding on constructive discharge is the law of this
case, Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983), and in any
event is the law of this Circuit.

Ann Hopkins, having been

constructively discharged after she was rejected for partnership
in violation of Title VII, was entitled to full relief.
B.

The District Court's Authority

This court recently emphasized that
[d)istrict courts nrust strive to grant "the most
complete relief possible" in cases of Title VII
violations. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S.
747, 764 (1976). In particular, the courts nrust make
the victim "whole" by '"plat:[ing him], as near as may
be, in the situation he would have cx::cupied if the
- 11 -

wrong had not been committed.'" Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, 422 U.S. at 418-19 (quoting Wicker v.
Hoppock, 6 Wall 94, 99 (1867)).
Lander v. Lujan, 888 F.2d. 153, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
Since plaintiff was denied admission to a partnership because of
prohibited discrimination, "the most complete relief possible"
would include an order requiring that partnership be offered to
her.
There is no question that the district court had authority
to direct defendant to admit Hopkins to partnership.
was effectively decided in Hishon v. King

&

That issue

Spalding, 467 U.S. 69

(1984), which the Supreme Court in the present case cited in
noting that "[d]ecisions pertaining to advancement to partnership
are, of course, subject to challenge under Title VII."
at 1781 n.l.

Y

109 s.ct.

In Hishon the Court expressly rejected the

contention that applying Title VII to decisions on partnership
admission would impinge on associational freedom.
77-78.

467 U.S. at

This discussion has resonance precisely because of the

possibility that a partnership might be required -- over
objection -- to admit someone to its ranks.

Here, moreover,

Price Waterhouse is a nationwide firm of over 900 partners, "so
concerns about freedom of association have little force."

Remand

Decision at 18.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected contentions about
freedom of association even when made by nonprofit organizations

y As the Supreme Court understood, this case deals only
with advancement to partnership. , Hence defendant misses the mark
by citing cases that question whether Title VII applies to
disputes among partners.
See defendant's stay motion at 11-12.
- 12 -

that were established for social and community betterment
purposes, when their size and business-rel ated features brought
them within the regulatory ambit of state and local antidiscriminatio n laws.

New York State Club Association v. City of

New York, 108 s.ct. 2225 (1988); Board of Directors of Rotary
Internationa l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 107 s.ct. 1940 (1987);
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1987).

In

Roberts, the Court pointedly contrasted the intimacy, personal
attachment and selectivity of family relationship s with "an
association lacking these qualities -- such as a large business
enterprise," noting that the latter type of organization "seems
remote from the concerns giving rise to the constitution al
protection of expressive association."

468 U.S. at 620.

Earlier this year, the Supreme Court again forcefully
rejected the idea that partnerships enjoy special status under
Title VII.

In University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 110 s.ct. 577

(1990), the Court held that peer review materials related to

university tenure decisions are not privileged and are subject to
normal discovery rules.

Among other things, the Court reasoned

that
[a]cceptance of petitioner's claim would also lead to
a wave of similar privilege claims by other employers
who play significant roles in furthering speech arrl
learning in society. What of writers, publishers,
ItnlSicians, lawyers? It surely is not unreasonable to
believe, for exanple, that confidential peer reviews
play an inportant part in partnership determinations
at some law finns.
Id. at 585.
In University of Pennsylvan~a v. EEOC; as in Hishon, the
Supreme Court looked to see whether Congress had intended to
- 13 -

grant the claimed exception.

Finding no such intention, the

Court refused to tailor the requirements of Title VII to the
preferences of particular categories of employers.

And just last

week, the Court declined to review the First Circuit's approval
of an order requiring a university to award tenure to a
successful Title VII plaintiff.

Brown v. Trustees of Boston

University, 891 F.2d 337 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 58
U.S.L.W. 3796 (June 18, 1990).

First Amendment concerns are

present to a greater degree in the academic setting than in a
far-flung business enterprise, but even in academia full relief
is required for violations of Title VII.
If tenure is a sensitive area, appointment to unique
positions in the upper reaches of the Executive Branch is even
more so.

Yet in Lander v. Lujan, 888 F.2d at 153, this Court

affirmed an order requiring that the plaintiff be placed in just
such a position, the senior civil service job in his agency.

The

order in Lander was extraordinary, moreover, in requiring the
"bumping" of an innocent employee, but this Court held that
bumping was permissible if needed to accord make-whole relief to
the plaintiff.

In the present case, of course, no incumbent

partners will lose their status when Hopkins is admitted;
partnership in Price Waterhouse is open-ended and is granted to
40 or more candidates every year.
The lesson that emerges from these decisions is clear:
courts will do what is needed to provide complete relief to those
subjected to violations of Title VII.

Their powers are fully

adequate to that basic purpose and are to be used to achieve

-

14 -

it.

In this regard, it is also relevant that this Court, when it

first considered this case, indicated at three different points
in its opinion that it viewed an offer of partnership as the
appropriate prospective relief and assumed that the district
court would have ordered such relief if it had found constructive
discharge. 2/
C.

The District Court's Sound Exercise of Discretion

Judge Gesell had the authority to require Price Waterhouse
to admit Ann Hopkins to partnership.

This was a discretionary

decision, and he exercised his discretion carefully,
conscientiously and correctly -- and in furtherance of Title
VII's twin remedial objectives of eradicating discrimination and
making victims whole.
405, 421 (1975).

Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.

There was no abuse of discretion here.

Ann Hopkins was denied admission to the firm because of her
sex in violation of Title VII.

The law requires full relief to

J_J See 825 F.2d at 464: "Having concluded that Hopkins was a
victim of sexual discrimination, the trial judge went on to find
that she was nevertheless not entitled to an order directing the
firm to make her a partner."

Id. at 464-65: "Accordingly, the [trial] court denied her
both backpay from the date of her resignation and a decree
requiring that she be invited to join Price Waterhouse as a
partner."
Id. at 472: "With respect to post[r]esignation damages, the
District Court found that Hopkins had failed to demonstrate that
she had been constructively discharged and therefore was
ineligible both for backpay subsequent to the date of her
resignation and an order directing that she be made a partner."
Emphasis supplied. As noted above, the dissent observed that
"[t]he majority's treatment of the relief issues . . . seems
correct." 825 F.2d at 473 n.1.
- 15 -

Title VII victims.

Given this, Judge Gesell reasoned that

ordering Price Waterhouse to make Ms. Hopkins a
partner would appear to be the appropriate remedy
unless some factor makes such an order inequitable or
otherwise inappropriate. 'Ihe Court finds that no
significant factor of this kind exists.
Remand Decision at 17.
Judge Gesell was quite familiar with the players here.

He

recognized that "extreme workplace hostility" may counsel against
reinstatement, but he found that "this is not such a case."
Id.

The plain fact is that Price Waterhouse just doesn't want to

admit Ann Hopkins as a partner but, as this Court had held and
Judge Gesell heeded, "[a] district court's discrimination remedy
cannot turn on the employer's preferences."
F.2d at 158.

Lander v. Lujan, 888

See Remedy Decision at 17.

The district court carefully weighed several other arguments
made by Price Waterhouse.

The court concluded that associational

freedom was not a real issue; that Hopkins would not initially be
exercising significant influence within the firm, so that
partnership would mean only that she would get increased economic
opportunity; and that she had the "necessary skills" to be a
partner in her area of expertise.

Id. at 18.

These findings are

not subject to challenge.
The court also considered and rejected defendant's proposal
that the selection process just be rerun on a nondiscriminatory
basis:
Ordering Price Waterhouse to simply reconsider Ms.
Hopkins for partnership would be futile arrl unjust,
because the testimony of Price Waterhouse's chainnan
at the relief trial suggested that the deck is stacked
against her. Price Waterhollse plainly does not want
her arrl would not voluntarily admit her. Partnership,
- 16 -

not sin,ply a new vote, is the logical remedy, given
the finding that Ms. Hopkins was likely to have been
made a partner if not for unlawful discriminat ion.
Remand Decision at 19.

Y

Finally, Judge Gesell considere d the possibili ty of front
pay in lieu of actual admission to partnersh ip but reasoned that
it might not make her whole or, conversel y, could provide an
unwarrant ed windfall.

Moreover, the court was "skeptica l as to

whether monetary relief alone provides a sufficien t deterrent
against future discrimin ation for a group of highly-pa id
partners. "

Remedy Decision at 19.

In sum, Judge Gesell considere d all pertinent factors with
an eye toward vindicatin g the national policy embodied in Title
VII.

His choice of remedy -- that Price Waterhous e be required

to admit Ann Hopkins into the partnersh ip -- constitute d a sound
exercise of discretion and should not be reversed.

Lander v.

Lujan, 888 F.2d at 156.
In the absence of discrimin ation, Hopkins would have been
admitted to the firm on July 1, 1983.

Under the district court's

remedial order she will be admitted effective July 1, 1990.
Hopkins sought some $680,000 in back compensat ion for this
period.

The court gave Price Waterhous e the benefit of the doubt

on several mitigatio n issues, however, and ultimately awarded
$371,175.

Defendant can hardly complain about this.

y The First Circuit in Brown v. Trustees of Boston
Universit y, 891 F.2d at 360, also rejected the notion that full
relief under Title VII could be achieved simply by rerunning the
decision-m aking process.
- 17 -
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CONCLUSION
This is a well traveled case.

As a consequence, the issues

on appeal are exceedingly narrow -- whether Judge Gesell
committed clear error in determining that Price Waterhouse did
not carry its burden of proof on remand and hence did not avoid
liability, and whether he abused his discretion in directing Ann
Hopkins' admission to the firm.

In its stay papers, Price

Waterhouse has not even suggested the possibility of error on
liability, and its arguments on remedy are ill-founded.
In its stay papers, as in the Supreme Court and earlier in
this Court, Price Waterhouse does its best to paint an
unflattering portrait of Hopkins and asks plaintively how the
firm can be forced to accept her.

But the district court,

following instructions from the Supreme Court, has found that the
true reason for Hopkins' failure to become a partner in 1983 was
her sex.

This finding of liability -- which Price Waterhouse

cannot hope to challenge -- triggers full relief.

Judge Gesell

understood this, and he approached the issue of remedy with
sensitivity, mindful both of the facts of this case and the
imperatives of the law.

- 18 -
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~

The district court's decision and remedial order should be
summarily affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

KA R, SCOTT & HELLER
1275 K Street, N.W.
Suite 950
Washington, D.C.
20005
Attorneys for Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On June 27, 1990 this Motion for Summary Affirmance was
delivered by hand to:

Theodore B. Olson
Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher
1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
20036
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